Proposed Strait of Hormuz Agreement Would Give Iran Power Over Incoming Ships, Sources Say

A diplomatic plan intended to reopen the Strait of Hormuz could hand Iran something months of military pressure failed to prevent: formal influence over one of the world’s most important shipping routes.

Iran and Oman are discussing an arrangement that would allow Tehran to oversee vessels entering the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz. Oman would retain a role on the opposite side of the waterway, although the exact division of authority remains under negotiation.

The proposal could ease a global energy crisis by restoring commercial traffic through the strait. However, it could also transform Iran from a country threatening the route into a recognized gatekeeper with the power to inspect ships, influence passage conditions and potentially collect transit payments.

That possibility has created an uncomfortable question for Washington and Gulf governments: Is reopening Hormuz worth legitimizing Iranian control over it?

A concession hidden inside a reopening plan

The proposed Hormuz deal reportedly gives Iran authority over ships traveling into the Gulf. Negotiators have not yet established what that authority would mean in practice, leaving major questions about inspections, security clearances and enforcement unresolved.

Regional governments are pushing for inspections to remain under broader Gulf supervision rather than allowing Iran to act alone. They are also seeking language that would make any transit fees voluntary, limiting Tehran’s ability to turn the strait into a permanent toll route.

Iran wants a more powerful role. Tehran has reportedly sought payments equal to between 5% and 7% of the value of cargo passing through the waterway. Oman has discussed a lower figure of roughly 3%, while the United States continues to oppose transit charges altogether.

Even a formally voluntary payment system could become difficult for shipping companies to resist. Tanker operators may conclude that paying Iran is cheaper than risking delays, inspections, seizure or attack.

The result could resemble a security fee in name but a compulsory toll in practice.

The meaning of “control” remains dangerously unclear

The central dispute is no longer simply whether the Strait of Hormuz will reopen. It is about who will decide which ships may pass, what conditions they must meet and what happens when Iran objects.

Iran’s proposed authority appears strongest over inbound traffic, meaning ships entering the Gulf. Tehran is also seeking influence over outbound vessels carrying oil, liquefied natural gas and other exports from Gulf states.

Another reported version of the plan would divide the shipping lanes, with Iran overseeing inbound movements and Oman managing outbound traffic. That framework could be temporary, but it would still establish a precedent that Iran may later seek to make permanent.

The distinction matters because control can take several forms. It could involve monitoring ships, approving routes, conducting inspections or issuing security instructions. A stronger interpretation could allow Iran to delay or block vessels based on their nationality, cargo, ownership or links to governments Tehran considers hostile.

Until negotiators define the word, the proposal remains both a diplomatic opening and a strategic risk.

Trump says a breakthrough is close, but negotiators remain cautious

President Donald Trump has presented the negotiations as evidence that the Strait of Hormuz could reopen soon. His administration paused further attacks on Iran while giving the Oman-led talks more time to produce an agreement.

People familiar with the negotiations have been less confident. They say important questions remain unresolved and warn that political statements from either Washington or Tehran could disrupt the process.

That gap between public optimism and private caution reflects the fragility of the talks. Iran is negotiating directly with Oman rather than the United States, allowing both Tehran and Washington to avoid the political cost of formal face-to-face discussions.

Oman has frequently served as a discreet diplomatic bridge between Iran and Western governments. In this case, however, it is not merely carrying messages. Its territory sits directly opposite Iran at the strait, making Muscat an essential participant in any workable traffic arrangement.

A temporary agreement could reopen the waterway while postponing the most difficult disputes. It might reduce immediate shipping pressure without resolving the larger struggle over Iran’s military power, nuclear program and regional influence.

The world’s energy markets are watching every detail

The Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. Before the latest conflict, roughly 20 million barrels of oil passed through it each day, equal to about one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption. The route also carried around one-fifth of global liquefied natural gas trade.

Few alternative routes can handle those volumes. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates operate pipelines capable of bypassing Hormuz, but their available capacity covers only a fraction of the energy normally transported through the strait.

This limited flexibility gives Iran enormous leverage. Even uncertainty over access can raise tanker insurance costs, disrupt delivery schedules and force energy buyers to search for more expensive supplies.

Oil markets moved higher after Iran-aligned Houthi forces announced another attack on a Saudi-flagged tanker in the Red Sea. The incident highlighted the danger of simultaneous pressure at Hormuz and near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the other major shipping gateway linking Asian trade routes with the Red Sea and Suez Canal.

The combined threat means ships cannot easily escape disruption by changing routes. A vessel avoiding Hormuz may still face danger near Yemen, while longer diversions increase fuel, crew and insurance costs.

Iran could emerge stronger from the conflict

The proposed agreement carries implications far beyond shipping. The United States entered the conflict promising to weaken Iran and protect freedom of navigation. Yet an arrangement that recognizes Iranian authority over inbound Gulf traffic could leave Tehran with more formal control than it possessed before the fighting began.

Iran would be able to portray the deal as proof that military pressure failed. Its leaders could argue that the United States and Gulf governments ultimately accepted Tehran’s demand for a decisive role in managing the strait.

That narrative could strengthen Iran’s position across the region. It may reassure allied armed groups that continued resistance produces political concessions while raising doubts among U.S. partners about Washington’s ability to enforce its stated limits.

The agreement could also create tension between the United States and Gulf states. Governments dependent on the strait may prefer an imperfect deal that restores exports, while Washington may resist any arrangement that appears to reward Iran.

For oil-producing states, reopening the route is an economic necessity. For the United States, the terms of reopening carry strategic and political consequences.

Fees could become the deal’s most explosive issue

Transit payments may determine whether the proposal succeeds or collapses.

Iran views fees as compensation for providing security and managing traffic. Its opponents see them as an attempt to profit from a crisis Tehran helped create.

A charge based on cargo value would be especially significant. Large oil and gas shipments can be worth tens of millions of dollars, meaning a percentage-based payment could generate substantial revenue for Iran.

Shipping companies would almost certainly pass much of that cost to customers. Higher transit expenses could eventually affect fuel, electricity, manufacturing and transportation prices far beyond the Middle East.

A compromise might describe payments as optional service charges rather than mandatory tolls. Yet that wording would have limited value if shipowners believed refusing to pay could expose their vessels to additional scrutiny or danger.

The true test would therefore not be what the agreement calls the payments. It would be whether ships could safely pass without making them.

A reopened strait would not immediately restore confidence

Even if negotiators announce an agreement, shipping may not return to normal overnight. Operators must evaluate naval mines, damaged infrastructure, military activity and the possibility of renewed attacks. Insurance companies must decide whether the danger has fallen enough to lower premiums, while crews and vessel owners must determine whether Iranian assurances are reliable.

Before the conflict, an average of about 138 ships passed through the strait each day. Traffic later fell dramatically as fighting, restrictions and security warnings left vessels delayed or trapped.

A political announcement may reopen the route on paper. Rebuilding commercial confidence could take much longer.

The proposed Hormuz deal is therefore more than a technical arrangement for directing ships. It represents a potential reordering of power at the entrance to the Persian Gulf.

For Iran, the agreement could deliver recognition, influence and revenue. For Gulf governments, it could restore access to world markets. For Washington, it could end an expensive confrontation while forcing acceptance of a concession it once declared unthinkable. The strait may soon reopen, but the terms of passage could leave Iran standing at the gate.