ICE Medicaid Data Reached Palantir Despite Court-Ordered Privacy Limits
Federal immigration officials provided Palantir with Medicaid information that ICE was not authorized to possess, according to newly disclosed court filings.
The revelation raises fresh questions about whether federal agencies can reliably control sensitive government data once it enters sprawling immigration-enforcement systems.
The disputed information was not only transferred between government agencies but also reached a private technology contractor whose software assists ICE in identifying, mapping, and investigating potential deportation targets.
How Improperly Shared Medicaid Data Reached ICE and Palantir
The controversy began with a January 7, 2026, data transfer from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to ICE.
The dataset reportedly contained information involving millions of people, including individuals who were legally present in the United States. Another dataset involving Minnesota refugees included information about U.S. citizens.
Those categories mattered because U.S. District Judge Vince Chhabria had imposed strict limits on what federal health officials could disclose to immigration authorities.
Under the court’s December ruling, CMS could share certain biographical and location information concerning immigrants without lawful status in the 22 states challenging the policy. It could not provide detailed medical information or Medicaid records belonging to U.S. citizens and lawfully present immigrants in those states.
The January transfer crossed those boundaries, according to federal admissions described in the litigation. ICE was subsequently instructed to delete information it should not have received.
New filings show ICE also shared the January dataset with Palantir. Palantir operates ELITE, an application ICE uses to display possible locations linked to noncitizens who may face immigration enforcement.
This disclosure broadens the issue from improper interagency access to include contractor access, data duplication, and deletion controls.
Deleting a Chat Message May Not Delete Every Copy
Court documents show the disputed material was shared with Palantir and other contractors via a Microsoft Teams conversation.
Federal officials informed the states that the material was deleted from the chat after plaintiffs questioned whether contractors had removed it.
However, deleting a file from a chat does not guarantee that all downloaded, copied, cached, or separately stored versions have been removed.
This issue became more significant when ICE found, after a broader search, that six users still had copies of the January 7 dataset.
This discovery followed an ICE official’s initial statement that the improperly shared file had been deleted and not used for law enforcement purposes.
Alberto Briseno, section chief with ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations, acknowledged the technical challenges in ensuring every version of the file was found. He stated that ICE would continue efforts to locate and delete additional copies.
Palantir did not immediately respond to questions about whether it had fully deleted the dataset. The Department of Homeland Security also did not respond regarding the transfer.
This raises a central accountability question: When sensitive information is distributed across government accounts, messaging systems, and contractor environments, which agency can confidently certify its complete deletion?
States Challenge ICE’s Request for Even Broader Medicaid Access
More than 20 Democratic attorneys general are citing the latest disclosures to oppose the federal government’s effort to expand ICE access to Medicaid information.
The Justice Department has asked the court to allow information sharing with a broader group of noncitizens, potentially including those without citizenship, permanent residence, or other forms of permanent legal status.
The states argue that ICE’s difficulty in identifying and deleting records already in its possession undermines its case for receiving additional data.
They also contend that each newly disclosed mistake makes it more difficult to reassure Medicaid recipients, providers, and the public that confidential information will remain protected.
Judge Chhabria had already warned the government during an April 30 hearing that continued mistakes could end the data-sharing arrangement. “If the federal government cannot be sufficiently careful then it can’t use the information,” he said.
In late May, the judge temporarily suspended CMS data sharing for immigration enforcement after federal officials acknowledged the January transfers exceeded the limits of his order.
An August hearing is expected to address continuing disagreements over which noncitizen records may legally be released.
Why Medicaid Privacy Concerns Extend Beyond Immigration Enforcement
Medicaid databases contain more than just names. State agencies provide CMS with demographic, eligibility, and claims information necessary to administer the program.
The federal T-MSIS system may include age, race, ethnicity, enrollment details, managed-care records, and medical service claims.
Researchers have warned that available Medicaid data may not cleanly distinguish undocumented immigrants from lawfully present people who qualify only for emergency services or face other eligibility restrictions.
This limitation creates a practical problem. A court may permit information about one legal category while protecting another, but the database may not allow officials to accurately distinguish between these groups.
KFF researchers reported that 51 percent of immigrant adults surveyed in 2025 were concerned that health officials or medical providers might share their information with ICE or Customs and Border Protection.
Fourteen percent said they or a family member had avoided medical care since January 2025 because of immigration-related concerns.
These concerns can affect both citizens and immigrants. Mixed-status families may include undocumented parents, lawful residents, and U.S.-born children in the same household. A parent who fears a hospital visit could expose relatives to enforcement may delay care for an eligible child or avoid emergency treatment.
The administration has maintained that sharing selected Medicaid information supports immigration priorities and helps identify people who may be improperly receiving benefits.
The courts have not categorically prohibited all cooperation between health and immigration agencies, but they have imposed limits on what information may be transferred from the states involved in the lawsuit.
The latest Palantir disclosure shifts the focus from whether data may be shared to whether federal agencies can control it after it is shared. When protected Medicaid records move from CMS to ICE, then to a contractor, and remain in multiple user accounts after deletion orders, the government’s data safeguards become central to the legal dispute.
